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Recently, a few transcranial magnetic stimulation or transcranial direct current
stimulation (tDCS) studies have shown that the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ)
plays a causal role in moral reasoning especially in cases of accidental harms
or attempted harms. The profile of results across studies is, however, not entirely
consistent: sometimes the stimulation affects predominantly attempted harms while
sometimes the stimulation affects predominantly accidental harms. We argue that
such discrepancy could reflect different functional contributions of the rTPJ in moral
judgments and that the chosen design parameters or stimulation method may
differentially bring to light one or the other functional role of the rTPJ. In the current
study, we found that tDCS specifically affected accidental harms but not attempted
harms. Low cathodal stimulation of the rTPJ led to a marginally significant increase
in the severity of judgments of accidental harms (Experiment 1) while higher cathodal
current density led to a highly significant decrease in the severity of judgments of
accidental harms (Experiment 2). Our pattern of results in the context of our experimental
design can best be explained by a causal role of the rTPJ in processing the mitigating
circumstances which reduce a protagonist’s moral responsibility. We discuss these
results in relation to the idea that the rTPJ may play multiple roles in moral cognition
and in relation to methodological aspects related to the use of tDCS.
Keywords: tDCS, rTPJ, moral judgment, moral responsibility, mitigating circumstances
INTRODUCTION
The right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) is seen as one of the key regions of what is now
commonly coined the “theory of mind network” (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Young et al., 2010b;
Krall et al., 2014; Schurz et al., 2014), i.e., the brain network sustaining our ability to explain and
predict someone’s behavior on the basis of his or her mental states (Premack and Woodruff, 1978).
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More recently, the rTPJ has also been associated with moral
reasoning, i.e., when participants are asked what someone ought
to do (Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007) or when
participants are asked to judge whether what someone is doing
is permissible, should be blamed or should be punished (Young
et al., 2007; Cushman, 2008; Young and Saxe, 2008; Koster-Hale
et al., 2013; Yoder and Decety, 2014).
The majority of the studies which have shown the involvement
of the rTPJ in moral cognition are imaging studies which only
provide correlational evidence. Only a handful of studies have
investigated the potential causal role of the rTPJ in moral
cognition. The study by Jeurissen et al. (2014) examined moral
judgments in the context of moral dilemmas, emphasizing thus
the role of emotions in moral judgments while three other studies
(Young et al., 2010a; Sellaro et al., 2015; Ye et al., 2015) examined
moral judgments in the context of accidental harm or failed
attempts to harm (hereafter referred to as attempted harm),
examining thus the role of intentional attribution and theory of
mind in moral judgments.
In the paradigm used in these three latter studies (Young
et al., 2010a; Sellaro et al., 2015; Ye et al., 2015), the intention
of the agent (no intention to harm vs. intention to harm)
was orthogonally manipulated with the outcome of the action
(neutral outcome vs. harmful outcome) to create four types
of scenarios: two types of scenarios where the intention and
the outcome are compatible (“neutral scenarios” where the
protagonist has no intention to harm and no harm occurs as
outcome of the action or “intentional harm scenarios” where
the intention is to harm and harm occurs as outcome of the
action) and two types of scenarios in which the intention and the
outcome are in conflict (“accidental harm scenarios” in which the
agent has no intention to harm but an harmful outcome occurs
and “attempted harm scenarios” in which the agent intends to
harm but no harmful outcome occurs).
Interestingly, rTPJ stimulation modulated judgments of
certain moral scenarios more specifically and not always the same
type of scenarios across studies (see Table 1). Understanding
the origin of these discrepancies could provide useful insights
into the role of the rTPJ in moral judgments. If the role of the
rTPJ in moral judgment is related to the attribution of mental
states, we should expect that the effects of rTPJ stimulation
will directly depend on the mentalizing demands of the moral
scenarios. Such demands may vary not only quantitatively (some
scenarios requiring more mentalizing than others) but also
qualitatively (different scenarios leading to different forms of
mentalizing). At least three qualitatively different sources of
mentalizing demands can be identified in the moral scenarios
described above. One source of mentalizing demands relates to
the processing of the agent’s belief about the outcome of his
action. It has been extensively documented in the theory of
mind literature that the rTPJ is particularly sensitive to situations
where an agent holds a false belief (e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003; Perner et al., 2006), that is, when there is a mismatch
between the agent’s perspective (what the agent falsely thinks
about the state of the world) and the participant’s perspective
(what the participant knows is the true state of the world).
According to this interpretation of the role of the rTPJ, one
would expect the rTPJ stimulation to only affect moral judgments
in the attempted harm and accidental harm scenarios. Indeed,
these are the only two conditions in which the agent of the
story holds a false belief (the mismatch between the intention
and the outcome in these conditions always resulted from the
agent holding a false belief about the potential outcome of his
action). None of the transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) or
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) results perfectly fit
with this interpretation (Table 1) even though this seems to be
the main interpretation put forward in these studies. In the case
of Young et al. (2010a) and Ye et al. (2015), a significant effect
of stimulation was found for attempted harm scenarios but the
effect did not reach significance for accidental harm scenarios.
Sellaro et al. (2015) found the opposite profile, with an effect for
accidental harm scenarios but not for attempted harm scenarios.
It has been proposed that this discrepancy simply results from
ceiling effects which lead to a lack of sensitivity to inhibitory
stimulation when one judges accidental harms and a lack of
sensitivity to excitatory stimulation when one judges attempted
harms (Sellaro et al., 2015). Indeed, in their article, Sellaro et al.
(2015) explained their diverging results from Young et al. (2010a)
with the idea that belief information has a different weight in
the accidental and attempted harm scenarios. More specifically,
the negative belief information leading to the understanding that
the agent has a desire to harm someone else is salient in the
attempted harm scenarios and so the activation of the rTPJ is
claimed to be more pronounced. In the case of the accidental
harm scenarios, the neutral belief information is less salient and
the activation of the rTPJ is claimed to be less pronounced.
Increasing the excitability of the rTPJ would thus be more likely
to increase the contribution of belief representations in the
case of the accidental harm scenarios (where the rTPJ is less
activated because of the neutral intention) than in the case of the
attempted harm scenarios (where the rTPJ is already activated
because of the harmful intention). The reverse reasoning is
applied to the inhibitory stimulation which would be more likely
to decrease the contribution of belief representations in the
attempted harm scenarios (where the rTPJ is more activated
because of the harmful intention) than in the accidental harm
scenarios (where the rTPJ is less activated because of the neutral
intention).
Beliefs are not the only mental states which mismatch across
the participants and the agent presented in the moral scenarios.
On the assumption that most people do not want to harm others,
there is also a mismatch when the agent has a desire to harm
someone. The processing of the agent’s desire may thus be a
second source of variability in terms of mentalizing demands
across the moral scenarios. This is compatible with evidence
for a more general role of the rTPJ in dealing with conflicting
mental states (Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Santiesteban et al., 2012).
According to this interpretation, we could expect a stronger
modulation of moral judgments following rTPJ stimulation when
the agent has a desire to harm (i.e., in the case of attempted
harm scenarios and intentional harm scenarios) than when the
agent has no desire to harm (i.e., in the accidental harm scenarios
and in the neutral scenarios). This interpretation of the role
of the rTPJ should not be seen as incompatible with a role in
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belief processing and one could thus expect additive effects of
rTPJ stimulation whereby (1) accidental and attempted harm
scenarios would be more affected than neutral or intentional
harm scenarios because the processing of the agent’s belief and (2)
attempted harm scenarios would be even further affected because
of the processing of the agent’s harmful desire. Such additive
effects are globally compatible with the results of Young et al.
(2010a) and those of Ye et al. (2015).
Finally, a third source of variable mentalizing demands in
the moral scenarios used so far relates to the processing of
mitigating circumstances disculpating the author of the harmful
act [for example, when the harm was due to mental illness
(Buckholtz et al., 2008, 2015; Koster-Hale et al., 2013)]. According
to this account, the rTPJ would play a key role in processing the
various pieces of information necessary to judge someone’s moral
responsibility (Buckholtz et al., 2015). In the moral scenarios
discussed here, only the accidental harm condition involves
mitigating circumstances which should affect the agent’s moral
responsibility. Indeed, in that condition, while the agent had a
causal role in the harmful consequences of his actions, he had
no intention to harm. Note that in the case of failed attempts to
harm, there is no real mitigating circumstance about the agent’s
moral responsibility per se (the harmful intention is clear and
there are no mitigating circumstances provided in the scenarios
to justify the agent’s harmful intention) but there are, however,
mitigating circumstances related to the amount of deserved
punishment, since no actual harm occurred. The integration of
information about the degree of harm caused in order to assign
punishment has been hypothesized to be sustained by other
brain areas than the rTPJ such as the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; Buckholtz et al., 2008,
2015; Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). The results of Sellaro et al.
(2015) which showed that increasing the excitability of the rTPJ
with anodal tDCS caused participants to judge accidental harms
as more morally permissible with no effect on attempted harms,
are in line with this interpretation of the role of the rTPJ in
processing mitigating circumstances (even though this is not the
authors’ interpretation of their results).
Given that there is independent evidence to support all three
roles of the rTPJ in moral reasoning, it is plausible that the
specifics of the moral scenarios and moral questions used can
accentuate one or the other contributing role of the rTPJ and
hence influence the specific pattern of results across the different
types of moral scenarios. To our knowledge, the hypothesis
that the rTPJ plays a “causal” role in processing the mitigating
circumstances which reduce an agent’s moral responsibility has
not been directly tested yet. In the current tDCS study, we used
a design that should bring out such contributing role of the rTPJ.
We used a blame (Experiment 1) or punishment (Experiment
2) question instead of the moral permissibility question used
in the previous TMS and tDCS studies. Indeed, judging how
much blame or punishment an agent deserves is thought to more
directly assess moral responsibility reasoning (e.g., Buckholtz
et al., 2008, 2015; Buckholtz and Marois, 2012).
In addition to the change of moral question, we also used a
different electrode montage compared to the two previous tDCS
studies (Sellaro et al., 2015; Ye et al., 2015) discussed before
so that we could more selectively target the rTPJ. In the two
previous tDCS studies, a return rather than a reference electrode
was used. A return electrode is smaller than a reference electrode
and is still considered as an “active” electrode which influences
the excitability of the brain region stimulated. In the case of the
study by Sellaro et al. (2015), this means that both the rTPJ (where
the stimulation electrode was placed) and the left supraorbital
area (where the return electrode was placed) were stimulated
simultaneously (note, however, that the authors showed that
stimulating the left supraorbital area in a montage using a larger
reference electrode on the rTPJ was not sufficient to produce the
effect on accidental harm, providing thus indirect evidence that it
was the stimulation of the rTPJ which was at the origin of the
effect). In the case of Ye et al. (2015), it was the left TPJ that
was stimulated by the return electrode simultaneously with the
rTPJ. The specific contribution of the rTPJ remains thus unclear
in these two studies. In our study, we used a larger reference
electrode that might be considered as “passive” so that the sole
active electrode was placed over the rTPJ. This prevented us
from measuring combined effects of the stimulation and return
electrodes. If the rTPJ plays a causal role in the processing of
mitigating circumstances to disculpate the agent, we should find
a stronger effect of the rTPJ stimulation for the accidental harm
compared to the attempted harm scenarios and compared to the
neutral or intentional harm scenarios.
EXPERIMENT 1
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifty-one students participated in this study in return of a
small honorarium. Data from three participants were removed
because of technical or human failures (leaving 16 participants
in each group). All 48 remaining participants (27 female,
mean age 22.33 ± 2.41 (SD), range 18–29 years) were healthy
volunteers without any known psychiatric or neurological
disorder and no contraindications to tDCS. They were all
right handed according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(Oldfield, 1971). They had normal or corrected to normal
vision and spoke French fluently. Written informed consent
was obtained. Participants were assigned following a random
double blind procedure1 to one of the three experimental
conditions (anodal, cathodal, and sham). The three groups were
equivalent in terms of age (F < 1) and gender (χ2 < 1).
During post-experiment briefing, participants did not report
any expectations that were in line with our hypotheses. This
study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations
of the Commission d’Ethique Biomédicale Hospitalo-Facultaire
de la Faculté de Médecine de l’UCL (registration number:
1We used the Newronika tDCS system which is made up of two devices, the
programming device and the stimulator device. Two experimenters were involved
in the experiments. One of the experimenters entered the stimulation parameters
in the programming device and the other experiment used the stimulator device
with participants. Thus, the experimenter in contact with the participants did not
know the condition in which each participant was assigned to.
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B403201214597) with written informed consent from all
participants.
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
The stimulation was delivered with a constant direct current
stimulator (HDC-stim, Newronika, Milan, Italy) connected to
two sponge electrodes. The 25 cm2 stimulation electrode was
placed on the rTPJ over CP6 (same location as Santiesteban
et al., 2012) according to the 10–20 EEG international system
(Sharbrough et al., 1991; Herwig et al., 2003). The 51 cm2
reference electrode was placed over C3. A large reference
electrode has been demonstrated to be functionally inert without
diminishing the efficacy of the tDCS under the stimulation
electrode (Nitsche et al., 2008). A current intensity of 0.8 mA
was used for 20 min of stimulation (10 min oﬄine stimulation –
10 min online stimulation). With these parameters, the current
density was 0.032 mA/cm2 and the total charge was 0.038 C/cm2.
For the anodal and cathodal stimulations, the current ramped up
until 100% intensity in 7 s. Once 100% of intensity was reached,
the current remained constant until the end of the treatment. For
the sham stimulation, the setup was the same as in the two other
groups except that the current was turned off after it had ramped
up to 100% intensity in the first 7 s. Thus, participants in the sham
group also felt the initial itching sensation but received no active
current for the rest of the stimulation. This method should be
sufficient to keep participants blind to the stimulation condition
(Gandiga et al., 2006; Ambrus et al., 2012).
Material
The verbal vignettes used in this study were inspired from those
used by Young et al. (2007) and Cushman (2008). In adapting
the vignettes, we followed recent recommendations to control
for various parameters which can bias moral judgments (see
Christensen and Gomila, 2012). The vignettes were presented in
a standardized structure: one sentence presenting the context,
one sentence presenting the protagonist’s belief and action
(on the basis of which his intention to harm or not could
be inferred) and one sentence with the action consequence
(i.e., whether it caused or not harm to another person). Both
protagonists (the agent and the victim) were always described
in the third-person perspective (rather than placing participants
in the role of one of the protagonists), they both had the same
gender, they had names of equivalent frequency in the Belgian
population and their relationship was not defined (control
for kinship/friendship effect). The harm always occurred by
action (never by omission), and there was never a self-benefice
for the agent-protagonist. Furthermore, the harm occurred in
the absence of physical contact between the two protagonists
(control for the directness of harm) and the harm was always
a physical injury (control for the kind of transgression). We
also used familiar contexts to encourage everyday life moral
judgments.
The experimental design consisted of an orthogonal
manipulation of two factors, the intention to harm (no intention
to harm vs. intention to harm) and the outcome of the action
(neutral outcome vs. harmful outcome). Sixty-four contexts
were created for the vignettes and each of these contexts was
narrated in four different ways in order to conform to the four
conditions of the 2 × 2 design (“neutral scenarios”: no intention
to harm – neutral outcome; “accidental harm scenarios”:
no intention to harm – harmful outcome; “attempted harm
scenarios”: intention to harm – neutral outcome; “intentional
harm scenarios”: intention to harm – harmful outcome; see
Table 2), yielding a total of 256 vignettes. From these 256
vignettes, four lists were created so that each list included one
of the 64 contexts and 16 vignettes per condition (16 neutral
scenarios, 16 accidental harm scenarios, 16 attempted harm
scenarios, 16 intentional harm scenarios). The different lists
were equivalent in terms of number of words. Each list was
further subdivided into two blocks: 32 vignettes to be presented
before the tDCS stimulation (pre-stimulation condition) and 32
vignettes to be presented during and after the tDCS stimulation
(post-simulation condition), with an equal number of vignettes
(n = 8) per condition. The set of vignettes presented before and
after stimulation was counterbalanced across participants. The
full set of scenarios can be freely accessed via the following link:
https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3427853.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The vignettes were presented in a pseudorandom order using
PsychoPy 1.76.00 (Peirce, 2007, 2009), with the conditions
counterbalanced across blocks and subjects. We used a similar
procedure as the one proposed by Greene et al. (2001) in order
to control for the moment in which the participant was exposed
to each piece of information in the scenario. The vignettes
were presented in three cumulative segments (previous segments
remained on the screen when later segments were added): (1)
the contextual information (12 s), (2) the protagonist’s belief and
action (an additional 8 s), (3) the outcome (an additional 4 s). All
of the story text was then removed from the screen and replaced
with the question and the horizontal response scale. Subjects had
7 s to judge “How much should the agent’s behavior be blamed?”
(“A quel point est-ce blamable de se comporter comme l’agent?”)
on the 7-points response scale ranging from 1 “Not at all” (“Pas
du tout”) to 7 “Very much” (“Tout à fait”).
The first block of vignettes was presented without any
stimulation (baseline). There was then a 20-min break, with the
first 10 min of the break used for the electrode montage and the
next 10 min to start the tDCS stimulation. The second block of
vignettes was then presented with only the first 10 min still under
tDCS stimulation (anodal, cathodal, and sham; see Figure 1 for
an illustration of the tDCS stimulation timing).
Results
Factors Affecting Blame Ratings at Baseline
In a first analysis, we examined the factors influencing
participant’s blame ratings prior to any tDCS. We conducted a
repeated measure ANOVA on the ratings at baseline without
distinguishing the groups and with Intention (intention to harm
vs. no intention to harm) and Outcome (harmful outcome vs.
neutral outcome) as within-subject factors.
We found a significant main effect of Intention
[F(1,47) = 316.689, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.871], with intention
to harm scenarios (mean 5.31 ± SE 0.12) being judged more
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TABLE 2 | Examples of scenarios used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Neutral Intention Harmful Intention
EXPERIMENT 1
Neutral Outcome Neutral scenario:
Steve and Nathan work in a shop. They restock the new merchandises
on the shelves in the storehouse. Steve fills the top shelves while
Nathan puts the products just below.
Steve thinks that the shelf will not break under the weight of the
boxes. Steve puts the box on it.
The shelf does not break and Nathan is OK.
Attempted Harm scenario:
Steve and Nathan work in a shop. They restock the new merchandises
on the shelves in the storehouse. Steve fills the top shelves while
Nathan puts the products just below.
Steve thinks that the shelf will break under the weight of the boxes.
Steve puts the box on it.
The shelf does not break and Nathan is OK.
Harmful Outcome Accidental Harm scenario:
Steve and Nathan work in a shop. They restock the new merchandises
on the shelves in the storehouse. Steve fills the top shelves while
Nathan puts the products just below.
Steve thinks that the shelf will not break under the weight of the
boxes. Steve puts the box on it.
The shelf breaks and Nathan is hurt.
Intentional Harm scenario:
Steve and Nathan work in a shop. They restock the new merchandises
on the shelves in the storehouse. Steve fills the top shelves while
Nathan puts the products just below.
Steve thinks that the shelf will break under the weight of the boxes.
Steve puts the box on it.
The shelf breaks and Nathan is hurt.
EXPERIMENT 2
Neutral Outcome Neutral scenario:
Steve and Nathan work in a shop. They restock the new merchandises
on the shelves in the storehouse. Steve fills the top shelves while
Nathan puts the products just below. Steve puts the box on it.
Steve thought that the shelf would not break under the weight of the
boxes.
The shelf does not break and Nathan is OK.
Attempted Harm scenario:
Steve and Nathan work in a shop. They restock the new merchandises
on the shelves in the storehouse. Steve fills the top shelves while
Nathan puts the products just below. Steve puts the box on it.
Steve thought that the shelf would break under the weight of the
boxes.
The shelf does not break and Nathan is OK.
Harmful Outcome Accidental Harm scenario:
Steve and Nathan work in a shop. They restock the new merchandises
on the shelves in the storehouse. Steve fills the top shelves while
Nathan puts the products just below. Steve puts the box on it.
Steve thought that the shelf would not break under the weight of the
boxes.
The shelf breaks and Nathan is hurt.
Intentional Harm scenario:
Steve and Nathan work in a shop. They restock the new merchandises
on the shelves in the storehouse. Steve fills the top shelves while
Nathan puts the products just below. Steve puts the box on it.
Steve thought that the shelf would break under the weight of the
boxes.
The shelf breaks and Nathan is hurt.
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the tDCS protocol used in Experiments 1 and 2.
blameworthy than no intention to harm scenarios (2.75 ± 0.10)
and, a significant main effect of Outcome [F(1,47) = 70.484,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.600], with harmful outcome scenarios
(4.58 ± 0.08) being judged more blamable than neutral outcome
scenarios (3.48 ± 0.13). The Intention × Outcome interaction
was not significant [F(1,47) = 0.378, p= 0.542, η2p = 0.008].
Note that a further analysis with tDCS condition (anode vs.
cathode vs. sham) as additional between-subject factor showed
that the effects mentioned above where present in all three groups
prior to the start of stimulation. Indeed, there was no significant
tDCS condition interaction [all F(2,45) < 2.346, all p > 0.107, all
η2p < 0.094].
Modulation of Blame Judgments as a Function of
tDCS Condition
In order to examine changes in ratings as a consequence of
tDCS, we conducted a repeated measure ANOVA on the ratings
with Intention (intention to harm vs. no intention to harm),
Outcome (harmful outcome vs. neutral outcome), and Time (pre-
stimulation vs. post-stimulation) as within-subject factors and
with tDCS Condition (anode vs. cathode vs. sham) as between-
subject factor. Any interaction effects involving both Time and
tDCS Condition were of particular interest. No such interaction
effect was statistically significant [all F(2,45) < 2.007, all p> 0.146,
all η2p < 0.082].
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Nevertheless, to explore the data, we conducted pairwise
comparisons comparing pre-stimulation with post-stimulation
ratings for each of the four types of scenarios (neutral
scenarios, accidental harm scenarios, attempted harm scenarios,
and intentional harm scenarios). The analyses showed a
marginally significant effect (at an uncorrected level for multiple
comparisons) for one experimental condition, namely the
accidental harm condition [t(15) =−2.080, p= 0.055, d= 0.564],
with a marginally significant increase in the severity of blame
rating following tDCS cathodal stimulation (pre-stimulation:
3.50 ± 0.24; post-stimulation: 3.80 ± 0.18). No effect of Time
(pre- compared to post-stimulation) reached the significance
level in the anodal stimulation condition [all t(15) < 1.848, all
p > 0.084, all d < 0.472] or the sham stimulation condition [all
t(15) < 1.266, all p> 0.225, all d < 0.328; Figure 2].
Conclusion and Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 showed a marginal effect (1) of
cathodal stimulation only and (2) on accidental harm scenarios
only. This pattern of result is in line with the idea that the rTPJ
may play a role in the consideration of mitigating circumstances
when attributing moral responsibility. The effect was, however,
only marginally significant and could either reflect a lack of power
(due to sample size or current density) or could be a false positive.
We thus conducted a follow-up experiment with an improved
design.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate the results of Experiment
1 while improving the design. Firstly, we shortened the response
time (from 7 to 4 s) to better capture initial judgments. Secondly,
we clarified some sentences to avoid ambiguities and changed
the position of the action information in the scenario. In
Experiment 1, the action information was presented at the end
of the intention segment while in Experiment 2, the action
information was presented at the end of the context segment,
this minor change was done to facilitate the inference of the
agent’s intention. Thirdly, we used a punishment question (“How
much punishment tokens would you give to the agent?”) as
it appeared that participants did not all interpret the “blame”
question in the same way (some construed it as a punishment
judgment others as a wrongness judgment). Moreover, using a
punishment question increases the need to take into account
the outcome. Indeed, punishment assignment is thought to
occur after the attribution of moral responsibility (or blame)
and requires integrating the amount of harm caused (Buckholtz
et al., 2015). When an attempt to harm failed compared to
when it succeeds, the amount of punishment deserved should
be mitigated by the fact that no harm really occurred. An
absence of tDCS on attempted harms even though a punishment
question is used would thus also provide indirect support
for the hypothesis that it is not the rTPJ but other brain
areas which sustain such different form of mitigation. Thirdly,
we now explicitly asked participants to respond with their
right hand on a vertical response scale in order to avoid any
spatial effect due to the temporo-parietal brain area stimulation.
Finally, we increased the intensity of the tDCS from 0.8 to
1.5 mA.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventy-five new right-handed students participated in this study
for a small honorarium. Data from three participants were
removed because of technical or human failures (leaving 24
participants in each group). The recruitment procedure was
the same as for the study 1. All 72 remaining participants
[half female, mean age 21.65 ± 1.75 (SD), range 18–26 years]
were assigned following a random double blind procedure to
the tDCS conditions (anodal, cathodal, and sham). Groups
did not differ significantly in terms of age [F(2,69) = 2.901,
p = 0.062] and gender. Again, during the post-experiment
briefing, participants did not report any expectations that were in
line with our hypotheses. We followed the same ethical protocol
as in Experiment 1.
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
The procedure was exactly the same as for Experiment 1 with the
only exception that the current intensity was raised to 1.5 mA.
With this new parameter, the current density was 0.06 mA/cm2
and the total charge was 0.072 C/cm2.
Material
We used the same scenarios as the ones used in Experiment
1 (except for the changes mentioned above, see Table 2 for
examples). In addition, we conducted a pretest to collect ratings
about the severity of the harm resulting from the actions used
in our design. Thirty-three participants were asked to respond
to the question “The consequences for the victim are . . .?” (“Les
conséquences pour la victime sont . . .?”) on a scale from 0 “Not
serious at all” (“Pas graves du tout”) to 6 “Very serious” (“Très
graves”). We then averaged the scores for each scenario and we
split the 64 scenarios according to the median value (3.48); 33
scenarios were below the median split and were considered as low
harm severity scenarios and 31 scenarios were above the median
split and were considered as high harm severity scenarios. Within
each list of scenarios, harm severity was evenly distributed across
the different experimental conditions. The full set of scenarios
can be freely accessed via the following link: https://dx.doi.org/10.
6084/m9.figshare.3427853.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The design and the procedure were the same as in the Experiment
1 except for the changes mentioned above and the use of an
upgraded version of PsychoPy (1.78.00; Peirce, 2007, 2009) for
the stimuli presentation. Each participant was presented with
one version of each moral scenario and was asked to judge the
number of punishment tokens they would give to the agent. After
having read each scenario, subjects had 4 s to judge “How much
punishment tokens would you give to the agent?” (“Combien
de jetons de punition donneriez-vous à l’agent?”) on 7-points
response vertical scale from 0 punishment token to 6 punishment
tokens.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean blame ratings (from 1 “Not at all” to 7 “Very much”) as a function of moral scenarios (Intentional harm scenarios, Attempted harm
scenarios, Accidental harm scenarios and Neutral scenarios) and time (Pre-stimulation and Post-stimulation) for the Cathodal Group, the Anodal
Group, and the Sham Group. Error bars represent standard mean error. (∗)p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
Results
Factors Affecting Punishment Ratings at Baseline
In a first analysis, we examined the factors influencing
participant’s punishment ratings prior to any tDCS. We
conducted a repeated measure ANOVA on the ratings at
baseline without distinguishing the groups and with Intention
(intention to harm vs. no intention to harm), Outcome
(harmful outcome vs. neutral outcome), and Harm Severity
(high harm severity vs. low harm severity) as within-subject
factors.
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We found a significant main effect for all three factors:
Intention [F(1,71) = 354.535, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.833], Outcome
[F(1,71) = 231.171, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.765] and Harm
Severity [F(1,71) = 57.811, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.449], with
more severe punishment attributed when the intention was to
harm (3.68 ± 0.14) rather than neutral (0.97 ± 0.08), when
harm occurred (3.01 ± 0.09) compared to no harm occurred
(1.65 ± 0.10) and when the harm (really or potentially) caused
was high (2.53± 0.08) rather than low (2.12± 0.09).
We also found two significant interactions. First, the Intention
by Outcome interaction was significant [F(1,71) = 9.084,
p = 0.004, η2p = 0.113]. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni
correction showed a significant effect of Intention both for
harmful outcome scenarios (p < 0.001; intention to harm:
4.47 ± 0.13, no intention to harm: 1.55 ± 0.11) and for neutral
outcome scenarios (p< 0.001; intention to harm: 2.90± 0.17, no
intention to harm: 0.39± 0.60). This interaction can be explained
by a stronger effect of intention when the outcome was harmful
than when the outcome was neutral. The difference between
the punishment ratings of the intentional harm (mean = 4.47)
and the accidental harm (mean = 1.55) conditions was 2.92 and
numerically higher than the difference between the punishment
ratings of the attempted harm (mean = 2.90) compared to the
neutral conditions (mean = 0.39) which was 2.51. Pairwise
comparison with Bonferroni correction also showed a significant
effect of Outcome both for the intention to harm condition
(p < 0.001; harmful outcome: 4.47 ± 0.13, neutral outcome:
2.90 ± 0.17) and for the no intention to harm condition
(p < 0.001; harmful outcome: 1.55 ± 0.11, neutral outcome:
0.39± 0.60). Here, the interaction can be explained by a stronger
effect of the outcome when there was an intention to harm than
when there was no intention to harm. The difference between
the punishment ratings in the intentional harm (mean = 4.47)
and the attempted harm conditions (mean = 2.90) was 1.57
and numerically higher than the difference between the
punishment ratings in the accidental harm (mean = 1.55)
compared to the neutral conditions (mean = 0.39) which
was 1.16.
The second significant interaction was between Harm Severity
and Outcome [F(1,71) = 10.472, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.129]. Pairwise
comparison with Bonferroni correction showed a significant
effect of Harm Severity both for the harmful outcome condition
(p < 0.001; high harm severity: 3.29 ± 0.10, low harm
severity: 2.72 ± 0.11) and for the neutral outcome condition
(p < 0.001; high harm severity: 1.78 ± 0.10, low harm severity:
1.52 ± 0.10). The interaction can be explained by a stronger
effect of harm severity for the harmful outcome than for the
neutral outcome condition. Indeed, the difference between the
punishment ratings in the harmful outcome with high harm
severity (mean = 3.29) and the harmful outcome with low
harm severity (mean = 2.72) was 0.57, which is numerically
higher than the difference between the punishment ratings in
the neutral outcome with high harm severity (mean = 1.78)
and the neutral outcome with low harm severity (mean = 1.52)
which was 0.26. Pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction
also showed a significant effect of Outcome both for high harm
severity scenarios (p < 0.001; harmful outcome: 3.29 ± 0.10,
neutral outcome: 1.78 ± 0.10) and for low harm severity
scenarios (p < 0.001; harmful outcome: 2.72 ± 0.11, neutral
outcome: 1.52 ± 0.10). The interaction can be explained by
a stronger effect of the outcome for the high harm severity
than for the low harm severity. The difference between the
punishment ratings in the harmful outcome with high harm
severity (mean = 3.29) and the neutral outcome with high
harm severity (mean = 1.78) was 1.51 and numerically higher
than the difference between the punishment ratings in the
harmful outcome with low harm severity (mean = 2.72) and the
neutral outcome with low harm severity (mean = 1.52) which
was 1.20.
Finally, the interaction between Intention and Harm Severity
was not significant [F(1,71) = 3.459, p = 0.067, η2p = 0.046].
The triple interaction was not significant either [F(1,71) = 3.068,
p= 0.084, η2p = 0.041].
Note that additional analysis with tDCS Condition (anode
vs. cathode vs. sham) as between-subject factor showed that the
effects mentioned above where present in all three groups prior
to the start of stimulation. Indeed, there was no significant tDCS
Condition interaction [all F(2,69) < 2.114, all p > 0.128, all
η2p < 0.058].
Modulation of Punishment Judgments as a Function
of tDCS Condition
In order to examine changes in ratings as a consequence
of tDCS, we conducted a repeated measure ANOVA on the
ratings with Intention (intention to harm vs. no intention
to harm), Outcome (harmful outcome vs. neutral outcome),
Harm Severity (low harm severity vs. high harm severity),
and Time (pre-stimulation vs. post-stimulation) as within-
subject factors and with tDCS Condition (anode vs. cathode vs.
sham) as between-subject factor. Again, any interaction effect
involving both Time and tDCS Condition were of particular
interest.
The only such interaction effect which was sufficiently close
to the statistical significance level to be considered, was the
four-way Intention by Outcome by Time by tDCS Condition
interaction [F(2,69) = 3.123, p = 0.050, η2p = 0.083]. To explore
this interaction further, we conducted separate repeated measure
ANOVAs for each tDCS Condition with Intention, Outcome and
Time as within-subject factors. Any main effect or interaction
involving Time was of particular interest.
In the anodal stimulation condition, no effect involving Time
reached the significance level [all F(1,23) < 2.107, all p > 0.160,
all η2p < 0.084]. In the cathodal stimulation condition, there
was a significant three way Intention by Outcome by Time
interaction effect [F(1,23) = 9.463; p = 0.005, η2p = 0.292].
Paired-wise comparisons comparing pre-stimulation with post-
stimulation ratings for each of the four types of scenarios
(neutral scenarios, accidental harm scenarios, attempted harm
scenarios, and intentional harm scenarios) showed that the
ratings only changed for one type of scenarios, namely the
accidental harm scenarios [t(23) = 3.076, p = 0.005, d = 0.677],
with a significance decrease in the severity of punishment rating
following tDCS stimulation (pre-stimulation: 1.52 ± 0.23; post-
stimulation: 1.18 ± 0.19). This effect of cathodal stimulation on
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the accidental harm scenarios remained significant after applying
a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (the adjusted
threshold for significance in case of six paired-wise comparisons
is 0.05/6 = 0.008). In the sham condition, there was a significant
Intention by Time interaction effect [F(1,23) = 5.685, p = 0.026,
η2p = 0.198], however, none of the paired-wise comparisons
comparing pre-stimulation with post-stimulation ratings reached
significance [intention to harm : t(23) = −1.644, p = 0.114,
d = 0.335; no intention to harm : t(23) = 1.757, p = 0.092,
d = 0.350; Figure 3].
FIGURE 3 | Mean number of punishment tokens (from 0 “No punishment” to 6 “Strong punishment”) as a function of moral scenarios (Intentional
harm scenarios, Attempted harm scenarios, Accidental harm scenarios, and Neutral scenarios) and time (Pre-stimulation and Post-stimulation) for
the Cathodal Group, the Anodal Group, and the Sham Group. Error bars represent standard mean error. (∗)p < 0.10; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
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Conclusion and Discussion
Again, an effect of tDCS was observed in only one stimulation
condition (i.e., cathodal) and only one type of scenarios (i.e.,
accidental harms scenarios), with a highly significant decrease
in the severity of judgments of accidental harms under higher
cathodal current density. This effect of Time observed in the
cathodal stimulation was specific to the stimulation and not just
a general effect of Time.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across two experiments, we found that cathodal tDCS applied
to the rTPJ specifically modulated the moral judgments of
accidental harms; judgments of attempted harms were not
affected. A marginal increase in the severity of judgments of
accidental harms was found under low cathodal current density
(Experiment 1; but the effect did not reach the statistical
significance level) and a highly significant decrease in the severity
of such judgments was found under higher cathodal current
density (Experiment 2). On the other hand, anodal tDCS did not
significantly modulate moral judgments (Table 3). We discuss
these results in relation to the role of the rTPJ in moral cognition
and in relation to methodological aspects regarding the use of
tDCS in moral cognition.
What Is the Role of the rTPJ in Moral
Cognition?
While previous studies that investigated the role of the rTPJ
in moral cognition focused on the role of this brain region
in belief processing, in our study we examined the potential
additional role in processing the mitigating circumstances that
reduce the moral responsibility of someone who committed a
harmful action. Indeed, it has been recently proposed that the
rTPJ may be key in this particular important aspect of moral
reasoning (Buckholtz et al., 2008, 2015; Young and Saxe, 2009;
Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Koster-Hale et al., 2013). However,
so far the empirical evidence has only come from fMRI studies
and the link has been only correlational. Across the four types of
moral scenarios that we used in our study, there was only one type
that included circumstances which can reduce someone’s moral
responsibility (i.e., our accidental harm scenarios in which an
agent unintentionally harmed another person). Quite strikingly,
in both our experiments, this was the only type of scenarios
in which participants’ judgments were affected by the rTPJ
stimulation. Our results are thus in line with the idea that the rTPJ
plays a causal role in the processing of mitigating circumstances
when attributing moral responsibility.
Are there alternative explanations for our results? The first
alternative to be considered is that the differential pattern of
stimulation effect that we observed across the accidental and
attempted harm scenarios results from a combination of ceiling
and floor effects as proposed by Sellaro et al. (2015). As a
reminder, Sellaro et al. (2015) proposed that the rTPJ is key
in processing the false beliefs of the protagonist but that the
stimulation of the rTPJ can only manifest itself as a facilitation
of belief processing in the accidental harm scenarios under
anodal stimulation and as a reduction of belief processing in
the attempted harm condition under cathodal stimulation or
“inhibitory” TMS. This ceiling/floor effect hypothesis does not
account very well for our results as (1) we find both an increase
(Experiment 1) and a decrease (Experiment 2) of the reliance
on the protagonist’s harmless intention for the same accidental
harm scenarios and (2) no significant effect of stimulation for
the attempted harm scenarios with either cathodal or anodal
stimulation.
Both, the accidental and the attempted harm scenarios that
we used required to reason about beliefs and desires to infer
the protagonist’s intention. A second alternative explanation
is that the processing of beliefs and/or desires was harder in
the accidental than the attempted harm scenarios and that we
thus only observed a stimulation effect in the most demanding
condition. In terms of belief processing and given the way
our scenarios were constructed, it seems highly unlikely that
realizing that the protagonist’s belief was false was harder in
the accidental than the attempted harm scenarios. In terms of
desire processing, one could even argue that the mentalizing
demands may have been higher in the attempted than the
accidental harm scenarios as in the attempted harm scenarios
there was a stronger discrepancy between the protagonist’s desire
(to harm) and participants’ desire if they had been in the
same situation (we can indeed assume that most participants
adhered to the moral norm of not hurting other people as
demonstrated by their higher blame and punishment ratings
when the protagonist had an intention to harm). Thus, there
seems no obvious reason why belief or desire reasoning would
have been harder in the accidental than the attempted harm
scenarios.
Overall, it seems rather that it is the processing of intention
and its integration in moral judgment that best explains the
difference between accidental and attempted harm scenarios. In
the case of attempted harm scenarios, there is no information
available that could reduce the protagonist’s moral responsibility
since participants can only come to the conclusion that the
protagonist intended to harm someone. Thus even if during
the reading of the attempted harm scenarios, participants were
looking for mitigating circumstances, none were to be found.
Increasing or decreasing the efficiency of the search for and
integration of mitigating circumstances could thus not impact
on participants’ blame or punishment ratings of attempted
harms. In contrast, in the accidental harm scenarios, the
protagonist’s false belief constitutes a mitigating circumstance.
Here increasing or decreasing the efficiency of the search
for and integration of mitigating circumstances should indeed
directly impact on the blame or punishment ratings. It is
interesting to note that the rTPJ does not seem to play a
general role in adjusting moral judgment according to available
circumstances. Judgments of intended harms that failed (i.e.,
attempted harms) are usually adjusted compared to intended
harms that succeeded (i.e., intentional harms) in terms of
punishment because no actual harm occurred in the former.
Buckholtz et al. (2015) recently showed that the adjustment in
moral judgment linked to the amount of harm caused to the
victim can be causally linked to the DLPFC. In line with this, no
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effect of rTPJ stimulation was found on attempted harms in our
study.
While our results are compatible with a role of the rTPJ
in processing the mitigating circumstances that can reduce
someone’s moral responsibility (such as mental illness or
accidental harm), we do not want to claim that this is the sole
role of the rTPJ in moral cognition. The contribution of the
rTPJ in moral judgment is probably multiple and includes the
processing of the beliefs and desires of the persons involved.
The potential to measure each contributing role of the rTPJ
may, however, depend on the specific design and methods used
in a study. For example, in our study the harmful outcomes
were less severe than in previous studies (unlike the scenarios
used in previous studies, Young et al., 2010a; Sellaro et al.,
2015; Ye et al., 2015, scenarios used in our experiments never
resulted in someone’s death). In case of severe harmful outcomes,
participants may be more reluctant to consider mitigating
circumstances, thereby preventing the observation of a change
in the efficiency of mitigating circumstances processing following
rTPJ tDCS. Secondly, our choice of punishment and blame
questions rather than a permissibility question (all previous
studies used a permissibility question) may have put more
weight on the search for mitigating circumstances. Indeed,
searching for mitigating circumstances is particular important
for establishing the moral responsibility of an agent, and moral
responsibility is particularly important to decide the extent to
which the agent should be blamed or punished (Buckholtz
et al., 2015). It is possible that other types of questions and/or
scenario characteristics would recruit more the processing of the
agents’ beliefs and intentions than the processing of mitigating
circumstances. In the latter case, depending on the possible
existence of ceiling/floor effects discussed by Sellaro et al. (2015),
rTPJ tDCS would either affect judgments of attempted or
accidental harm scenarios rather than both types of scenarios. It
would be important to investigate the impact of the questions and
scenarios characteristics in future research.
Methodological Aspect about the Use of
tDCS in Moral Cognition
In our two experiments, we only found significant effects under
cathodal stimulation. This is surprising given that in most
previous studies which used tDCS to investigate mentalizing,
cathodal stimulation showed no effect (e.g., Santiesteban et al.,
2012; Sellaro et al., 2015). Some authors noticed that the effects of
cathodal stimulation are less consistent for higher-order cognitive
functions (Jacobson et al., 2012). When considering more largely
the literature on the effects of tDCS on social cognition, it is
in fact not unusual to find the modulation of social behavior
following either cathodal (e.g., Karim et al., 2010; Mai et al.,
2016) or anodal stimulation (e.g., Priori et al., 2008; Santiesteban
et al., 2012; Kuehne et al., 2015; Sellaro et al., 2015) but not
both. Some studies showed that gender may influence which
type of stimulation is effective (Fumagalli et al., 2010) and others
have highlighted the possible role of ceiling effects in cortical
excitability (Karim et al., 2010; Sellaro et al., 2015). This clearly
needs further investigation.
In our two experiments, the cathodal stimulation had opposite
behavioral effects possibly depending on the current intensity
and hence the current density. In Experiment 1, lower intensity
cathodal stimulation led participants to make harsher judgments
consistent with the idea that they took less into account the
mitigating circumstances and that the stimulation may have
reduced the cortical excitability of the rTPJ. On the other
hand, in Experiment 2, higher intensity cathodal stimulation led
participants to make more lenient judgments consistent with
the idea that they took the mitigating circumstances more into
account and that the stimulation may have increased the cortical
excitability of the rTPJ. A generally accepted idea is that cathodal
stimulation decreases cortical excitability (e.g., Nitsche et al.,
2003b, 2008; Jacobson et al., 2012). However, new evidence
suggests that increasing the intensity or the duration of cathodal
stimulation, amongst other things, can induce shifts in cortical
excitability and lead cathodal stimulation to have facilitatory
effects (Batsikadze et al., 2013; Pirulli et al., 2014). Our data are
in line with these results as we changed the intensity and hence
the density of the direct current across our two experiments: in
Experiment 1, the current intensity was 0.8 mA (current density:
0.032 mA/cm2; total charge: 0.038 C/cm2) while in Experiment
2, the current intensity was raised to 1.5 mA (current density:
0.06 mA/cm2; total charge: 0.072 C/cm2). For future research,
it would be important to keep in mind that enhancing the
intensity of cathodal stimulation can shift the cortical excitability.
Putting together the findings from Santiesteban et al. (2012)
and Sellaro et al. (2015) and the fact that in our study we only
had effects after cathodal stimulation and that this effect was
the strongest when it had enhanced the cortical excitability,
the pattern of results fits with the idea that it is easier to
enhance the cortical excitability of the rTPJ with tDCS than to
reduce it.
In sum, the role of the rTPJ in moral cognition is probably
multiple and here we show evidence for a causal role of the
rTPJ in processing mitigating circumstances that can reduce
someone moral responsibility when causing harm. In our study,
the mitigating circumstance was the fact of causing harm
unintentionally but we could expect similar effects in the case
of other mitigating circumstances such as diminished mental
capacity (Buckholtz et al., 2008, 2015). It is likely that the
role of the rTPJ in moral cognition is not limited to this
specific role and that depending on the experimental design
one or the other types of role may be better brought to light.
Future investigations of these multiple roles and how they
depend on specific design parameters would help understand the
seemingly discrepant patterns of results observed so far following
rTPJ stimulation. tDCS seems a promising technique for such
investigation.
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